Difference between revisions of "File:The Network of Global Corporate Control.pdf"

From Wikispooks
Jump to navigation Jump to search
m (minor polish)
m (Text replacement - "fi" to "fi")
Line 25: Line 25:
  
 
One meaning of control in the corporate finance literature is the frequency by which a shareholder is
 
One meaning of control in the corporate finance literature is the frequency by which a shareholder is
able to influence the firm’ strategic decision during the official voting [12]. Differently, in this work, by
+
able to influence the firm’ strategic decision during the official voting [12]. Differently, in this work, by
 
control we mean how much economic value of companies a shareholder is able to influence. Moreover,
 
control we mean how much economic value of companies a shareholder is able to influence. Moreover,
we did not limit our focus on the control of a shareholder of a single firm. Instead, we look at the
+
we did not limit our focus on the control of a shareholder of a single firm. Instead, we look at the
control each shareholder has over its whole portfolio of directly and indirectly owned firms. As a result,
+
control each shareholder has over its whole portfolio of directly and indirectly owned firms. As a result,
 
the shareholders with a high level of control are those potentially able to impose their decision on many
 
the shareholders with a high level of control are those potentially able to impose their decision on many
high-value firms. The higher a shareholder’s control is, the higher its power to influence the final decision.
+
high-value firms. The higher a shareholder’s control is, the higher its power to influence the final decision.
In this sense, our notion of control can be related to Weber’s definition of “power”, i.e. the probability
+
In this sense, our notion of control can be related to Weber’s definition of “power”, i.e. the probability
 
of an individual to be able to impose their will despite the opposition of the others [13].
 
of an individual to be able to impose their will despite the opposition of the others [13].
  
 
'''Control of Financial Institutions'''
 
'''Control of Financial Institutions'''
  
90% of the top 50 of the 147 core companies that hold disproportionate power belong to the financial sector according to Table S1 of the Appendix (industry standard classification system (NACE) codes starting with 65xx,66xx,67xx).
+
90% of the top 50 of the 147 core companies that hold disproportionate power belong to the financial sector according to Table S1 of the Appendix (industry standard classification system (NACE) codes starting with 65xx,66xx,67xx).
  
 
==Top Control Holders==
 
==Top Control Holders==

Revision as of 11:38, 4 August 2015

Network analysis of the structure of global corporate interleaved ownerships and revenues.

Disclaimer (#3)Document.png paper  by Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, Stefano Battiston dated 2011/10/26
Subjects: Globalisation, Corporate power
Source: PLOS One (Link)


Wikispooks Comment

An analysis of the relationships between 43,000 transnational corporations has identified a relatively small group of 147 companies (out of 30 million economic actors in the 2007 Orbit database) with disproportionate power over the global economy. Connectedness clusters over time and money flows towards the most highly connected members, for 'business reasons'. These findings not only contradict common book learning of how markets should behave, it has also implications for social power structures.
See Also


The author's video presentation of the paper

★ Start a Discussion about this document



Abstract

The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions. This core can be seen as an economic ‘‘super-entity’’ that raises new important issues both for researchers and policy makers

Appendix

The Authors provide supporting information to the study, including Acronyms and abbreviations, Data and TNC Network Detection, Network Control, Degree and Strength Distribution Analysis, Connected Components Analysis, Bow-Tie Component Size, Strongly Connected Component Analysis, Network Control Concentration and Additional Tables. download pdf

Definition of "Control"

One meaning of control in the corporate finance literature is the frequency by which a shareholder is able to influence the firm’ strategic decision during the official voting [12]. Differently, in this work, by control we mean how much economic value of companies a shareholder is able to influence. Moreover, we did not limit our focus on the control of a shareholder of a single firm. Instead, we look at the control each shareholder has over its whole portfolio of directly and indirectly owned firms. As a result, the shareholders with a high level of control are those potentially able to impose their decision on many high-value firms. The higher a shareholder’s control is, the higher its power to influence the final decision. In this sense, our notion of control can be related to Weber’s definition of “power”, i.e. the probability of an individual to be able to impose their will despite the opposition of the others [13].

Control of Financial Institutions

90% of the top 50 of the 147 core companies that hold disproportionate power belong to the financial sector according to Table S1 of the Appendix (industry standard classification system (NACE) codes starting with 65xx,66xx,67xx).

Top Control Holders

Table S1. Top 50 control-holders. Shareholders are ranked by network control (according to the threshold model, TM).

Green: financial sector (FS). Red: strongly connected component (SCC). Set of firms in which every member owns directly and/or indirectly shares in every other member.

Rank Economic actor name Country NACE code Network position Cumul. network control (TM, %)
1 BARCLAYS PLC GB 6512 SCC 4.05
2 CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES INC, THE US 6713 IN 6.66
3 FMR CORP US 6713 IN 8.94
4 AXA FR 6712 SCC 11.21
5 STATE STREET CORPORATION US 6713 SCC 13.02
6 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. US 6512 SCC 14.55
7 LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC GB 6603 SCC 16.02
8 VANGUARD GROUP, INC., THE US 7415 IN 17.25
9 UBS AG CH 6512 SCC 18.46
10 MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. US 6712 SCC 19.45
11 WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT CO. L.L.P. US 6713 IN 20.33
12 DEUTSCHE BANK AG DE 6512 SCC 21.17
13 FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC. US 6512 SCC 21.99
14 CREDIT SUISSE GROUP CH 6512 SCC 22.81
15 WALTON ENTERPRISES LLC US 2923 T&T 23.56
16 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP. US 6512 IN 24.28
17 NATIXIS FR 6512 SCC 24.98
18 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., THE US 6712 SCC 25.64
19 T. ROWE PRICE GROUP, INC. US 6713 SCC 26.29
20 LEGG MASON, INC. US 6712 SCC 26.92
21 MORGAN STANLEY US 6712 SCC 27.56
22 MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. JP 6512 SCC 28.16
23 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION US 6512 SCC 28.72
24 SOCIETE GENERALE FR 6512 SCC 29.26
25 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION US 6512 SCC 29.79
26 LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC GB 6512 SCC 30.30
27 INVESCO PLC GB 6523 SCC 30.82
28 ALLIANZ SE DE 7415 SCC 31.32
29 TIAA US 6601 IN 32.24
30 OLD MUTUAL PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY GB 6601 SCC 32.69
31 AVIVA PLC GB 6601 SCC 33.14
32 SCHRODERS PLC GB 6712 SCC 33.57
33 DODGE & COX US 7415 IN 34.00
34 LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC.* US 6712 SCC 34.43
35 SUN LIFE FINANCIAL, INC. CA 6601 SCC 34.82
36 STANDARD LIFE PLC GB 6601 SCC 35.2
37 CNCE FR 6512 SCC 35.57
38 NOMURA HOLDINGS, INC. JP 6512 SCC 35.92
39 THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY US 6512 IN 36.28
40 MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSUR. US 6601 IN 36.63
41 ING GROEP N.V. NL 6603 SCC 36.96
42 BRANDES INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. US 6713 IN 37.29
43 UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA IT 6512 SCC 37.61
44 DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION OF JP JP 6511 IN 37.93
45 VERENIGING AEGON NL 6512 IN 38.25
46 BNP PARIBAS FR 6512 SCC 38.56
47 AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC. US 6713 SCC 38.88
48 RESONA HOLDINGS, INC. JP 6512 SCC 39.18
49 CAPITAL GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC. US 7414 IN 39.48
50 CHINA PETROCHEMICAL GROUP CO. CN 6511 T&T 39.78

* Lehman still existed in the 2007 dataset used

File history

Click on a date/time to view the file as it appeared at that time.

Date/TimeDimensionsUserComment
current13:03, 1 October 2014 (530 KB)Peter (talk | contribs)A paper by: Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, Stefano Battist Category:Globalisation Category:Doc
  • You cannot overwrite this file.