Document:Euan Grant – Areas of Expertise and KPIs

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Euan Grant's assessment of his areas of expertise and Key Performance Indicators

Disclaimer (#3)Document.png self-assessment  by Euan Grant dated 26 December 2018
Subjects: Euan Grant
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/4
Source: Anonymous (Link)

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Euan Grant – Areas of Expertise and KPIs

Euan Grant – Areas of Expertise and KPIs

  • Personal area of expertise: Former Strategic Intelligence Analyst in HM Customs & Excise for transnational organised crime and post 12990s EU Accession States and ex-Soviet Union. Served under Andrew Parker 1999 – 2002. Subsequently worked in EU Border management, border control and Customs projects 2005 to 2014 in Ukraine (based for EUBAM in Border guard HQ), Moldova, all Baltic States, Finland, Poland and Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Contributor to BBC File on Four, LBC Radio, Sky TV and Moscow Times and Daily Telegraph on the geopolitics on Russian crime. In studio Contractor to Kroll Europe on oligarchs. Continuous commentator in studio for LBC on night of MH17. Member of RUSI and Chatham House. Advised 77 Brigade on strategic Russian speaking crime issues ahead of battle group deployment to Estonia.

  • My understanding: As commentators such as Mark Galotti and Edward Lucas have long pointed out, the Putin state has long co-opted Russian criminality to act as an information source, purveyor of corruption and in supporting foreign policy aims including murders outside Russia. However, due to difficulties to say the least in obtaining convictions or even meeting criminal standards of evidence against persons outside the jurisdiction, much information which would demonstrate these links are often limited in numbers and quality. This is especially so due to the lack of understanding of the semi militarised ethos of Russian society. By highlighting information sources and analytical methods – especially holistic examination of open source material in conjunction with official quantitative and qualitative information a more all-embracing and proactive picture can be obtained. This would enable the identification in advance of likely sources of Russian propaganda, enabling debunking to be achieved by highlighting the truth, in advance, and in limiting adverse effects from Russian manipulation of facts.

  • Outcomes, impact, effect KPIs: Delivery of written, verbal in person, remote verbal and PowerPoint briefings on synergising information warfare intelligence and counterintelligence for UK and EU financial sectors (e.g. ABI, BBA), militaries and police and other law enforcement agencies (e.g. NCA, ACPO, BKA Germany). Analysis of reports from these and academia and producing proposals for enhancing their use in information campaigns designed to counter Russian disinformation and misinformation. Produce guidance for law enforcement and media on how to corroborate links between Russian criminality in Europe and state institutions, in order to maximise publicity values relating to Russian failures to cooperate on international public safety issues – drugs, labour and sexual trafficking, cigarette smuggling, dangerous counterfeit goods, stoking arms conflicts through unscrupulous use of private military companies and of military assets.

  • My contribution in terms of activities: Reports / aide memoires for the financial sector on spotting Russian criminality, especially political links, and how information exchanges can be improved qualitatively and quantitatively. Produce evaluation report on strengths and weaknesses of Interpol, Europol, OSCE, UNODC reports on Russian criminals and their activities. Prepare report on Russian involvement in natural resource exploitation for UK and international NGOs – Transparency International, Corruption Watch, Save the Children, Global Witness. List in these Russian deception techniques. Produce short summary on equivalent reactive and proactive value of popular culture products – fiction, non-fiction, film, tv.

  • Risks: First deliverables may need to be modified for future audiences. Would require significant cooperation from militaries – much of it reservist – as well as law enforcement. Lack of cooperation from NATO or EU partner countries (think tanks, NGOs) would inhibit success.

Euan Grant 0794 989 4643 24th April 2018