Document:Nord Stream 2 requires military protection
Article of unknown authorship dated April 14, 2021Subjects: Nord Stream/Sabotage, Nord Stream
Source: Vzglyad (newspaper) (Link)
Auto translated text from the Russian original.
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Nord Stream 2 requires military protection
The West continues to put pressure on Russia to stop the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline - and the most important event in this chain was the Polish military provocations. Can opponents of the gas pipeline resort to real military operations against Nord Stream 2 - and if so, what should Russia counter this with?
Recall that in early April 2021, the situation around the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline seriously escalated. A significant number of civilian ships and warships (mostly Polish), as well as submarines, made dangerous maneuvers around the pipeline construction vessel Fortuna. Polish military aircraft flew around and over the construction site.
Real provocations and future sabotage
In parallel with the provocative actions, a number of Western officials made statements according to which Russia allegedly intends to use the pipeline to seize the Baltic, place its warships along it, and reconnaissance equipment on it. An example is an article by Polish official Stanislaw Zaryn, representative of the Polish Minister Coordinating Special Services, in the US online publication Defense News, in which he "warns" the US and the West that Russia may place "intelligence systems" on the pipeline. Similar insinuations have been heard in the West before, including from higher-ranking officials and politicians.
These statements, it can be assumed, are made in order to politically exclude in advance the possibility of Russia installing security systems near the pipeline and guarding it by our ships. To make sure that any attempt by Russia to guarantee the safe operation of Nord Stream 2 by special means could raise a scandal on the topic of “Russian aggression”. We are talking, in particular, about systems that would not allow sabotage to be carried out on it (the Poles are trying to present this equipment in advance as “reconnaissance systems”).
In other words, opponents of the strategic Russian gas pipeline want Nord Stream 2 to be technically defenseless against possible military operations. So, if necessary, it could be disabled with the help of sabotage means. Moreover, the "respected partners" have all the means for this. It sounds like some kind of cheap conspiracy theory, but, alas, there are no other rational explanations for these actions and statements.
Enough has already been said about the political and economic meaning of the attacks on Nord Stream 2 and Ukraine, the United States, and a number of other countries. It has been repeatedly stated that the construction of the gas pipeline is categorically unacceptable for both Kyiv and Washington. The commissioning of Nord Stream 2 will cause significant damage both to Ukraine and to the political course of the West to isolate our country. Numerous sanctions have already been adopted against the gas pipeline and new ones have been announced. And if all this does not help, it is quite possible to assume that military methods will be adopted. Of course, secret, because open military aggression against the gas pipeline is politically impossible.
Forces and means of the enemy
What military means can be used by a party wishing to harm the pipeline? There is an answer to this question.
The pipeline mainly runs at depths of about 100-150 meters, often closer to a hundred. The use of combat swimmers for sabotage at such a depth is excluded - the need to undergo decompression requires the presence of a vessel with a pressure chamber somewhere nearby, which in itself is a strong unmasking factor. In addition, such an operation takes time. The use of depth charges will unequivocally indicate that the military of some country was working. In addition, the stealth factor again arises - a ship with this weapon will not have time to leave after using it. The attack must be completely invisible.
Under such conditions, the most likely means to attack the pipeline is the so-called mine destroyer - a disposable uninhabited underwater vehicle (UUV), controlled from a surface ship via a fiber-optic cable, having its own television camera and a simple sonar. Such devices are in service with foreign fleets in huge quantities. The device carries an explosive charge on board, the remote detonation of which destroys the mine.
The main feature in the case of Nord Stream is that the device can be secretly launched from a ship located quite far (several kilometers) from the pipeline, and connected to the pipeline remotely. The explosion of the apparatus will be carried out when the ship is not next to it. It will be enough for the crew of the ship to simply throw the control equipment overboard in order to calmly leave the place of sabotage.
Poland has the ability to use such devices. The US, of course, too. In addition, the mercenary industry developed in the United States makes it possible to work not with the hands of their own military personnel or the military personnel of the Polish Armed Forces, but to use mercenaries to train some kind of "cannon fodder" for such an operation. For example, even from Ukraine, whose citizens are well aware of how the launch of Nord Stream 2 will turn out for their country.
The risk of launching such a UUV from a submarine is low. No one in the Baltic has powerful enough NLAs that could be launched through a 53 cm torpedo tube (standard for NATO), intelligence can uncover their development, and such a loss of surprise is unacceptable. The modernization of the submarine to carry the NPA from the outside, perhaps, will also be opened - and is also unacceptable. And this means that the main threat will be the threat from surface carriers.
There is a solution
Thus, our opponents have already clearly demonstrated their willingness to harm the project, and the security of Nord Stream (both) cannot be left to chance. The risk of sabotage against Nord Stream 2 using uninhabited underwater vehicles at least does not look zero. What should Russia do in such a situation?
It would be worth creating a pipeline defense system. And not only the second line of the Nord Stream, but also the first - the interruption of any of them is fraught with the same problems for Russia.
The basis for such a system should be hydroacoustic equipment that allows detecting the use of UUVs. This equipment could be placed on surface ships that could patrol the waters, at the bottom of which the pipeline lies. As a means of rapid response, one can consider a helicopter with a special unit on board, capable of quickly advancing to the area of the proposed operation of the NPA and detecting a vessel or carrier ship from the air.
It is hardly possible in this case to create a system that can prevent an attack in all cases. But it is quite possible to create a system for guaranteed interception of UUV carriers. This will create a reality for our adversaries in which they may be able to damage the pipeline, but absolutely cannot escape. And the operation against the Russian gas pipeline will certainly not be a secret. And this will make the operation technically possible, but politically impossible.
Defense Arsenal
Russia has the resources to quickly and inexpensively create such a security system.
And above all, there are carrier ships for it. We are talking about project 22160 patrol ships. The Russian Navy has already received two such ships, and so far none of them has been involved in real combat missions. Once, the Vasily Bykov PC performed tracking of a foreign warship, but it was a pure imitation of a combat mission, since, if necessary, the target ship would have left the slow-moving Bykov at high speed. Once the ship participated in the escort of the "Academician Chersky", but he could not protect the pipelayer from a foreign warship - there was nothing.
Apart from this case, these ships were used only for displaying the flag and for nothing else - simply because they can no longer be used for anything due to their design features. Now these ships are entering the combat structure of the 184th brigade of protection of the water area of the Black Sea Fleet in Novorossiysk, where there are no tasks for them.
It would be quite possible to transfer these ships to the Baltic and use them as part of the forces guarding the pipeline. This is both a real and feasible task for them.
They should be equipped with sonar equipment capable of detecting the use of UUVs in a protected water area, which can be quickly established. They have a place for landing. There is a helicopter hangar. Unless it is necessary to replace the launching devices (SPU) for boats on the sides and rebuild the compartment in the stern, where the landing assault boat (DSHL) is located, so that a normal seagoing boat can be used from it. Three boats and a helicopter will be quite sufficient for anti-sabotage missions.
Thus, these ships will suddenly turn out to be very necessary and useful and will receive a real purpose, and the most important pipeline for Russia will receive protection from saboteurs. Deploying this system can be fast and inexpensive.
