Difference between revisions of "Document:Introduction Banks"
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|source_name=Anonymous | |source_name=Anonymous | ||
|source_URL=https://www.cyberguerrilla.org/blog/operation-integrity-initiative-british-informational-war-against-all-part-6/Introduction Banks | |source_URL=https://www.cyberguerrilla.org/blog/operation-integrity-initiative-british-informational-war-against-all-part-6/Introduction Banks | ||
| − | |subjects=banking, influence, Russia, HSBC | + | |subjects=banking, influence, Russia, HSBC, GDPR |
|constitutes= Integrity Initiative/Leak/6 | |constitutes= Integrity Initiative/Leak/6 | ||
|description= "We shall be approaching a range of international banks and institutions, including the BBA and ABI, together with major accountancy firms. We will use the results of these discussions to inform academia, think tanks and central government in the UK, particularly NCA, HMRC and MOD. We will also seek to put our views and, with permission, those of others into the public domain in a range of countries." | |description= "We shall be approaching a range of international banks and institutions, including the BBA and ABI, together with major accountancy firms. We will use the results of these discussions to inform academia, think tanks and central government in the UK, particularly NCA, HMRC and MOD. We will also seek to put our views and, with permission, those of others into the public domain in a range of countries." | ||
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Further to our phone conversation of xxxxx I would like to provide further information about the project, and look forward to a meeting when convenient to yourselves. My original call was prompted by an approach made to me recently at the Royal United Services Institute, by Lord Evans, who suggested that Mr. [[Nick Fishwick]] might be the most appropriate contact. I remember Mr. Fishwick from his time at HM Customs & Excise when he made such an outstanding contribution to progress in the Law Enforcement Directorate where I worked. | Further to our phone conversation of xxxxx I would like to provide further information about the project, and look forward to a meeting when convenient to yourselves. My original call was prompted by an approach made to me recently at the Royal United Services Institute, by Lord Evans, who suggested that Mr. [[Nick Fishwick]] might be the most appropriate contact. I remember Mr. Fishwick from his time at HM Customs & Excise when he made such an outstanding contribution to progress in the Law Enforcement Directorate where I worked. | ||
| − | The Project’s purpose, as funded by the F&CO ( [[Andrew Pryce]], with day to day liaison currently by [[Adam Southgate]]) is to create and inform a network of researchers and publicists in the UK and the EU Member States, and in North America, to better identify Russian information issues which impact on the well-being and security of the UK and EU and NATO countries, and to better inform public and private awareness of the risks such operations pose and how they can be exposed and rebutted. Cyber criminality and warfare issues are not parts of our remit, although they certainly need to be considered. | + | The Project’s purpose, as funded by the F&CO ( [[Andrew Pryce]], with day to day liaison currently by [[Adam Southgate]]) is to create and inform a network of researchers and publicists in the UK and the EU Member States, and in [[North America]], to better identify Russian information issues which impact on the well-being and security of the [[UK]] and [[EU]] and [[NATO]] countries, and to better inform public and private awareness of the risks such operations pose and how they can be exposed and rebutted. Cyber criminality and warfare issues are not parts of our remit, although they certainly need to be considered. |
As a consequence of these efforts, I have the responsibility for increasing awareness of Russian, Russian speaking and Russian proxies organised crime links with these countries “Deep States” nexus of political, senior bureaucracy, military and military industrial complex, big business and, of course, security and intelligence services. We prefer the term “ strategic organised crime” and believe it is not capable of being adequately deterred by conventional criminal justice procedures. | As a consequence of these efforts, I have the responsibility for increasing awareness of Russian, Russian speaking and Russian proxies organised crime links with these countries “Deep States” nexus of political, senior bureaucracy, military and military industrial complex, big business and, of course, security and intelligence services. We prefer the term “ strategic organised crime” and believe it is not capable of being adequately deterred by conventional criminal justice procedures. | ||
| − | We shall be approaching a range of international banks and institutions, including the BBA and ABI, together with major accountancy firms. We will use the results of these discussions to inform academia, think tanks and central government in the UK, particularly NCA, HMRC and MOD. We will also seek to put our views and, with permission, those of others into the public domain in a range of countries. | + | We shall be approaching a range of international banks and institutions, including the BBA and ABI, together with major accountancy firms. We will use the results of these discussions to inform academia, think tanks and central government in the UK, particularly [[NCA]], [[HMRC]] and [[MOD]]. We will also seek to put our views and, with permission, those of others into the public domain in a range of countries. |
| − | This obviously leads to the need to consider both data protection following GDPR introduction and client and criminal or civil justice proceedings’ confidentiality requirements. We would not under any circumstances seek or divulge information naming clients, or otherwise identifying them. | + | This obviously leads to the need to consider both data protection following [[GDPR]] introduction and client and criminal or civil justice proceedings’ confidentiality requirements. We would not under any circumstances seek or divulge information naming clients, or otherwise identifying them. |
The nature of our outputs would change in the course of discussion with our contacts, such as yourselves, and F&CO and others such as NCA and HMRC. We would hope there would be mutually increased understanding of how Russian linked strategic criminality impacts and how it might be better identified and rebuffed. We would deliver these outputs, on an ongoing and evolving basis, through presentations at conferences and workshops for the financial and wider business communities, anti-corruption NGOs and through media articles and broadcast interviews. Where specific companies such as HSBC be mentioned, this would only be done with written permission and we would not at present expect to cite individual firms. | The nature of our outputs would change in the course of discussion with our contacts, such as yourselves, and F&CO and others such as NCA and HMRC. We would hope there would be mutually increased understanding of how Russian linked strategic criminality impacts and how it might be better identified and rebuffed. We would deliver these outputs, on an ongoing and evolving basis, through presentations at conferences and workshops for the financial and wider business communities, anti-corruption NGOs and through media articles and broadcast interviews. Where specific companies such as HSBC be mentioned, this would only be done with written permission and we would not at present expect to cite individual firms. | ||
| Line 38: | Line 38: | ||
I have also been given the name of [[Margaret Titmus]] in your Edinburgh office and would certainly welcome an opportunity to discuss issues with her and her team, as the situation in [[Scotland]] and in several northern and eastern European countries is of particular interest to us. | I have also been given the name of [[Margaret Titmus]] in your Edinburgh office and would certainly welcome an opportunity to discuss issues with her and her team, as the situation in [[Scotland]] and in several northern and eastern European countries is of particular interest to us. | ||
| − | I can be contacted as below. Within the wider team, I am working particularly closely with [[Chris Donnelly]], Director in Charge ( former MOD), [[Stephen Dalziel]] ( ex F&CO and BBC World Service) and Ms. [[Charlie Hatton]], our Chief Administrator. They can all be contacted via our office number below, and use the same email format as I do. | + | I can be contacted as below. Within the wider team, I am working particularly closely with [[Chris Donnelly]], Director in Charge ( former MOD), [[Stephen Dalziel]] ( ex [[F&CO]] and [[BBC]] World Service) and Ms. [[Charlie Hatton]], our Chief Administrator. They can all be contacted via our office number below, and use the same email format as I do. |
I thank you for your time earlier and look forward to hearing from HSBC. | I thank you for your time earlier and look forward to hearing from HSBC. | ||
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Yours sincerely, | Yours sincerely, | ||
| − | Euan Grant | + | [[Euan Grant]] |
Senior Fellow | Senior Fellow | ||
| − | Institute of Statecraft | + | [[Institute of Statecraft]] |
2 Temple Place | 2 Temple Place | ||
Latest revision as of 19:03, 20 November 2019
| "We shall be approaching a range of international banks and institutions, including the BBA and ABI, together with major accountancy firms. We will use the results of these discussions to inform academia, think tanks and central government in the UK, particularly NCA, HMRC and MOD. We will also seek to put our views and, with permission, those of others into the public domain in a range of countries." |
project proposal by Euan Grant dated June 2018Subjects: banking, influence, Russia, HSBC, GDPR
Example of: Integrity Initiative/Leak/6
Source: Anonymous (Banks Link)
★ Start a Discussion about this document
Introduction Banks
Governmental Relations Officer
HSBC Bank PLC
8 Canada Sq.
LONDON E14 5HQ
Dear Sir / Madam / Mr. / Ms,
Institute of Statecraft Integrity Initiative project countering Russian malign influence
Further to our phone conversation of xxxxx I would like to provide further information about the project, and look forward to a meeting when convenient to yourselves. My original call was prompted by an approach made to me recently at the Royal United Services Institute, by Lord Evans, who suggested that Mr. Nick Fishwick might be the most appropriate contact. I remember Mr. Fishwick from his time at HM Customs & Excise when he made such an outstanding contribution to progress in the Law Enforcement Directorate where I worked.
The Project’s purpose, as funded by the F&CO ( Andrew Pryce, with day to day liaison currently by Adam Southgate) is to create and inform a network of researchers and publicists in the UK and the EU Member States, and in North America, to better identify Russian information issues which impact on the well-being and security of the UK and EU and NATO countries, and to better inform public and private awareness of the risks such operations pose and how they can be exposed and rebutted. Cyber criminality and warfare issues are not parts of our remit, although they certainly need to be considered.
As a consequence of these efforts, I have the responsibility for increasing awareness of Russian, Russian speaking and Russian proxies organised crime links with these countries “Deep States” nexus of political, senior bureaucracy, military and military industrial complex, big business and, of course, security and intelligence services. We prefer the term “ strategic organised crime” and believe it is not capable of being adequately deterred by conventional criminal justice procedures.
We shall be approaching a range of international banks and institutions, including the BBA and ABI, together with major accountancy firms. We will use the results of these discussions to inform academia, think tanks and central government in the UK, particularly NCA, HMRC and MOD. We will also seek to put our views and, with permission, those of others into the public domain in a range of countries.
This obviously leads to the need to consider both data protection following GDPR introduction and client and criminal or civil justice proceedings’ confidentiality requirements. We would not under any circumstances seek or divulge information naming clients, or otherwise identifying them.
The nature of our outputs would change in the course of discussion with our contacts, such as yourselves, and F&CO and others such as NCA and HMRC. We would hope there would be mutually increased understanding of how Russian linked strategic criminality impacts and how it might be better identified and rebuffed. We would deliver these outputs, on an ongoing and evolving basis, through presentations at conferences and workshops for the financial and wider business communities, anti-corruption NGOs and through media articles and broadcast interviews. Where specific companies such as HSBC be mentioned, this would only be done with written permission and we would not at present expect to cite individual firms.
I have also been given the name of Margaret Titmus in your Edinburgh office and would certainly welcome an opportunity to discuss issues with her and her team, as the situation in Scotland and in several northern and eastern European countries is of particular interest to us.
I can be contacted as below. Within the wider team, I am working particularly closely with Chris Donnelly, Director in Charge ( former MOD), Stephen Dalziel ( ex F&CO and BBC World Service) and Ms. Charlie Hatton, our Chief Administrator. They can all be contacted via our office number below, and use the same email format as I do.
I thank you for your time earlier and look forward to hearing from HSBC.
Yours sincerely,
Senior Fellow
2 Temple Place
LONDON WC2R 3BD
Tel: + 44 207 836 5888
Mobile: + 44 794 989 4643 (also WhatsApp, Viber & Signal)
EGrant@statecraft.org.uk
www.statecraft.org.uk
June 2018
