Difference between revisions of "File:The Network of Global Corporate Control.pdf"
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|collection=No | |collection=No | ||
|authors=Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, Stefano Battiston | |authors=Stefania Vitali, James B. Glattfelder, Stefano Battiston | ||
− | |subjects=Globalisation, Corporate power | + | |subjects=Globalisation, Corporate power, Tax haven, Billionaire |
|source_name=PLOS One | |source_name=PLOS One | ||
|source_URL=http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0025995 | |source_URL=http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0025995 | ||
− | |comment=An analysis of the relationships between 43,000 transnational corporations has identified a relatively small group of 147 companies (out of 30 million economic actors in the 2007 Orbit database) with disproportionate power over the global economy. Connectedness clusters over time and money flows towards the most highly connected members, for 'business reasons'. These findings not only contradict common book learning of how markets should behave, it has also implications for social power structures. | + | |comment=An analysis of the relationships between 43,000 transnational corporations has identified a relatively small group of 147 companies (out of 30 million economic actors in the 2007 Orbit database) with disproportionate power over the global economy. Connectedness clusters over time and money flows towards the most highly connected members, for 'business reasons'. These findings not only contradict common book learning of how markets should behave, it has also implications for social power structures: although they represented 20 per cent of global operating revenues, a core of 1318 TNCs appeared to collectively own through their shares the majority of the world’s large blue chip and manufacturing firms – the “real” economy – representing a further 60 per cent of global revenues. |
|declassified=No | |declassified=No | ||
|see_also=The author's [http://www.ted.com/talks/james_b_glattfelder_who_controls_the_world video presentation of the paper] | |see_also=The author's [http://www.ted.com/talks/james_b_glattfelder_who_controls_the_world video presentation of the paper] | ||
+ | |||
+ | [https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228354-500-revealed-the-capitalist-network-that-runs-the-world/ “Revealed – the capitalist network that runs the world.”] New Scientist, October 24, 2011. | ||
}} | }} | ||
==Abstract== | ==Abstract== | ||
Line 25: | Line 27: | ||
One meaning of control in the corporate finance literature is the frequency by which a shareholder is | One meaning of control in the corporate finance literature is the frequency by which a shareholder is | ||
− | able to | + | able to influence the firm’ strategic decision during the official voting [12]. Differently, in this work, by |
− | control we mean how much economic value of companies a shareholder is able to | + | control we mean how much economic value of companies a shareholder is able to influence. Moreover, |
− | we did not limit our focus on the control of a shareholder of a single | + | we did not limit our focus on the control of a shareholder of a single firm. Instead, we look at the |
− | control each shareholder has over its whole portfolio of directly and indirectly owned | + | control each shareholder has over its whole portfolio of directly and indirectly owned firms. As a result, |
the shareholders with a high level of control are those potentially able to impose their decision on many | the shareholders with a high level of control are those potentially able to impose their decision on many | ||
− | high-value | + | high-value firms. The higher a shareholder’s control is, the higher its power to influence the final decision. |
− | In this sense, our notion of control can be related to Weber’s | + | In this sense, our notion of control can be related to Weber’s definition of “power”, i.e. the probability |
of an individual to be able to impose their will despite the opposition of the others [13]. | of an individual to be able to impose their will despite the opposition of the others [13]. | ||
'''Control of Financial Institutions''' | '''Control of Financial Institutions''' | ||
− | 90% of the top 50 of the 147 core companies that hold disproportionate power belong to the financial sector according to Table S1 of the Appendix (industry standard | + | 90% of the top 50 of the 147 core companies that hold disproportionate power belong to the financial sector according to Table S1 of the Appendix (industry standard classification system (NACE) codes starting with 65xx,66xx,67xx). |
==Top Control Holders== | ==Top Control Holders== | ||
Line 42: | Line 44: | ||
Table S1. Top 50 control-holders. Shareholders are ranked by network control (according to the threshold model, TM). | Table S1. Top 50 control-holders. Shareholders are ranked by network control (according to the threshold model, TM). | ||
+ | '''Green''': financial sector (FS). | ||
+ | '''Red''': strongly connected component (SCC). Set of firms in which every member owns directly and/or indirectly shares in every other member. | ||
{| class="wikitable" | {| class="wikitable" | ||
|- | |- | ||
Line 51: | Line 55: | ||
! Cumul. network control (TM, %) | ! Cumul. network control (TM, %) | ||
|- | |- | ||
− | | 1 || BARCLAYS PLC || GB || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 1 || BARCLAYS PLC || GB || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 4.05 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 2 || CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES INC, THE || US || {{Yes|6713 | + | | 2 || CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES INC, THE || US || {{Yes|6713}} || IN || 6.66 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 3 || FMR CORP || US || {{Yes|6713 | + | | 3 || FMR CORP || US || {{Yes|6713}} || IN || 8.94 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 4 || AXA || FR || {{Yes|6712 | + | | 4 || AXA || FR || {{Yes|6712}} || {{No|SCC}} || 11.21 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 5 || STATE STREET CORPORATION || US || {{Yes|6713 | + | | 5 || STATE STREET CORPORATION || US || {{Yes|6713}} || {{No|SCC}} || 13.02 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 6 || JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. || US || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 6 || JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. || US || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 14.55 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 7 || LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC || GB || {{Yes|6603 | + | | 7 || LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC || GB || {{Yes|6603}} || {{No|SCC}} || 16.02 |
|- | |- | ||
| 8 || VANGUARD GROUP, INC., THE || US || 7415 || IN || 17.25 | | 8 || VANGUARD GROUP, INC., THE || US || 7415 || IN || 17.25 | ||
|- | |- | ||
− | | 9 || UBS AG || CH || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 9 || UBS AG || CH || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 18.46 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 10 || MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. || US || {{Yes|6712 | + | | 10 || MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. || US || {{Yes|6712}} || {{No|SCC}} || 19.45 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 11 || WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT CO. L.L.P. || US || {{Yes|6713 | + | | 11 || WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT CO. L.L.P. || US || {{Yes|6713}} || IN || 20.33 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 12 || DEUTSCHE BANK AG || DE || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 12 || DEUTSCHE BANK AG || DE || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 21.17 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 13 || FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC. || US || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 13 || FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC. || US || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 21.99 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 14 || CREDIT SUISSE GROUP || CH || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 14 || CREDIT SUISSE GROUP || CH || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 22.81 |
|- | |- | ||
| 15 || WALTON ENTERPRISES LLC || US || 2923 || T&T || 23.56 | | 15 || WALTON ENTERPRISES LLC || US || 2923 || T&T || 23.56 | ||
|- | |- | ||
− | | 16 || BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP. || US || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 16 || BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP. || US || {{Yes|6512}} || IN || 24.28 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 17 || NATIXIS || FR || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 17 || NATIXIS || FR || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 24.98 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 18 || GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., THE || US || {{Yes|6712 | + | | 18 || GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., THE || US || {{Yes|6712}} || {{No|SCC}} || 25.64 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 19 || T. ROWE PRICE GROUP, INC. || US || {{Yes|6713 | + | | 19 || T. ROWE PRICE GROUP, INC. || US || {{Yes|6713}} || {{No|SCC}} || 26.29 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 20 || LEGG MASON, INC. || US || {{Yes|6712 | + | | 20 || LEGG MASON, INC. || US || {{Yes|6712}} || {{No|SCC}} || 26.92 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 21 || MORGAN STANLEY || US || {{Yes|6712 | + | | 21 || MORGAN STANLEY || US || {{Yes|6712}} || {{No|SCC}} || 27.56 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 22 || MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. || JP || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 22 || MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. || JP || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 28.16 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 23 || NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION || US || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 23 || NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION || US || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 28.72 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 24 || SOCIETE GENERALE || FR || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 24 || SOCIETE GENERALE || FR || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 29.26 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 25 || BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION || US || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 25 || BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION || US || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 29.79 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 26 || LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC || GB || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 26 || LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC || GB || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 30.30 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 27 || INVESCO PLC || GB || {{Yes|6523 | + | | 27 || INVESCO PLC || GB || {{Yes|6523}} || {{No|SCC}} || 30.82 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 28 || ALLIANZ SE || DE || 7415 || {{No|SCC | + | | 28 || ALLIANZ SE || DE || 7415 || {{No|SCC}} || 31.32 || |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 29 || TIAA || US || {{Yes|6601 | + | | 29 || TIAA || US || {{Yes|6601}} || IN || 32.24 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 30 || OLD MUTUAL PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY || GB || {{Yes|6601 | + | | 30 || OLD MUTUAL PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY || GB || {{Yes|6601}} || {{No|SCC}} || 32.69 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 31 || AVIVA PLC || GB || {{Yes|6601 | + | | 31 || AVIVA PLC || GB || {{Yes|6601}} || {{No|SCC}} || 33.14 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 32 || SCHRODERS PLC || GB || {{Yes|6712 | + | | 32 || SCHRODERS PLC || GB || {{Yes|6712}} || {{No|SCC}} || 33.57 |
|- | |- | ||
| 33 || DODGE & COX || US || 7415 || IN || 34.00 | | 33 || DODGE & COX || US || 7415 || IN || 34.00 | ||
|- | |- | ||
− | | 34 || LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC. || US || {{Yes|6712 | + | | 34 || LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC.* || US || {{Yes|6712}} || {{No|SCC}} || 34.43 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 35 || SUN LIFE FINANCIAL, INC. || CA || {{Yes|6601 | + | | 35 || SUN LIFE FINANCIAL, INC. || CA || {{Yes|6601}} || {{No|SCC}} || 34.82 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 36 || STANDARD LIFE PLC || GB || {{Yes|6601 | + | | 36 || STANDARD LIFE PLC || GB || {{Yes|6601}} || {{No|SCC}} || 35.2 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 37 || CNCE || FR || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 37 || CNCE || FR || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 35.57 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 38 || NOMURA HOLDINGS, INC. || JP || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 38 || NOMURA HOLDINGS, INC. || JP || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 35.92 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 39 || THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY || US || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 39 || THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY || US || {{Yes|6512}} || IN || 36.28 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 40 || MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSUR. || US || {{Yes|6601 | + | | 40 || MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSUR. || US || {{Yes|6601}} || IN || 36.63 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 41 || ING GROEP N.V. || NL || {{Yes|6603 | + | | 41 || ING GROEP N.V. || NL || {{Yes|6603}} || {{No|SCC}} || 36.96 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 42 || BRANDES INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. || US || {{Yes|6713 | + | | 42 || BRANDES INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. || US || {{Yes|6713}} || IN || 37.29 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 43 || UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA || IT || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 43 || UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA || IT || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 37.61 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 44 || DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION OF JP || JP || {{Yes|6511 | + | | 44 || DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION OF JP || JP || {{Yes|6511}} || IN || 37.93 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 45 || VERENIGING AEGON || NL || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 45 || VERENIGING AEGON || NL || {{Yes|6512}} || IN || 38.25 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 46 || BNP PARIBAS || FR || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 46 || BNP PARIBAS || FR || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 38.56 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 47 || AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC. || US || {{Yes|6713 | + | | 47 || AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC. || US || {{Yes|6713}} || {{No|SCC}} || 38.88 |
|- | |- | ||
− | | 48 || RESONA HOLDINGS, INC. || JP || {{Yes|6512 | + | | 48 || RESONA HOLDINGS, INC. || JP || {{Yes|6512}} || {{No|SCC}} || 39.18 |
|- | |- | ||
| 49 || CAPITAL GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC. || US || 7414 || IN || 39.48 | | 49 || CAPITAL GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC. || US || 7414 || IN || 39.48 | ||
|- | |- | ||
− | | 50 || CHINA PETROCHEMICAL GROUP CO. || CN || {{Yes|6511 | + | | 50 || CHINA PETROCHEMICAL GROUP CO. || CN || {{Yes|6511}} || T&T || 39.78 |
|- | |- | ||
|} | |} | ||
− | |||
− | |||
<p>* Lehman still existed in the 2007 dataset used</p> | <p>* Lehman still existed in the 2007 dataset used</p> | ||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
[[Category:Globalisation]] | [[Category:Globalisation]] | ||
[[Category:Doc]] | [[Category:Doc]] |
Latest revision as of 17:42, 3 December 2020
Network analysis of the structure of global corporate interleaved ownerships and revenues. |
Subjects: Globalisation, Corporate power, Tax haven, Billionaire
Source: PLOS One (Link)
Wikispooks Comment
An analysis of the relationships between 43,000 transnational corporations has identified a relatively small group of 147 companies (out of 30 million economic actors in the 2007 Orbit database) with disproportionate power over the global economy. Connectedness clusters over time and money flows towards the most highly connected members, for 'business reasons'. These findings not only contradict common book learning of how markets should behave, it has also implications for social power structures: although they represented 20 per cent of global operating revenues, a core of 1318 TNCs appeared to collectively own through their shares the majority of the world’s large blue chip and manufacturing firms – the “real” economy – representing a further 60 per cent of global revenues.
See Also
The author's video presentation of the paper
“Revealed – the capitalist network that runs the world.” New Scientist, October 24, 2011.★ Start a Discussion about this document
Abstract
The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions. This core can be seen as an economic ‘‘super-entity’’ that raises new important issues both for researchers and policy makers
Appendix
The Authors provide supporting information to the study, including Acronyms and abbreviations, Data and TNC Network Detection, Network Control, Degree and Strength Distribution Analysis, Connected Components Analysis, Bow-Tie Component Size, Strongly Connected Component Analysis, Network Control Concentration and Additional Tables. download pdf
Definition of "Control"
One meaning of control in the corporate finance literature is the frequency by which a shareholder is able to influence the firm’ strategic decision during the official voting [12]. Differently, in this work, by control we mean how much economic value of companies a shareholder is able to influence. Moreover, we did not limit our focus on the control of a shareholder of a single firm. Instead, we look at the control each shareholder has over its whole portfolio of directly and indirectly owned firms. As a result, the shareholders with a high level of control are those potentially able to impose their decision on many high-value firms. The higher a shareholder’s control is, the higher its power to influence the final decision. In this sense, our notion of control can be related to Weber’s definition of “power”, i.e. the probability of an individual to be able to impose their will despite the opposition of the others [13].
Control of Financial Institutions
90% of the top 50 of the 147 core companies that hold disproportionate power belong to the financial sector according to Table S1 of the Appendix (industry standard classification system (NACE) codes starting with 65xx,66xx,67xx).
Top Control Holders
Table S1. Top 50 control-holders. Shareholders are ranked by network control (according to the threshold model, TM).
Green: financial sector (FS). Red: strongly connected component (SCC). Set of firms in which every member owns directly and/or indirectly shares in every other member.
Rank | Economic actor name | Country | NACE code | Network position | Cumul. network control (TM, %) | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | BARCLAYS PLC | GB | 6512 | SCC | 4.05 | |
2 | CAPITAL GROUP COMPANIES INC, THE | US | 6713 | IN | 6.66 | |
3 | FMR CORP | US | 6713 | IN | 8.94 | |
4 | AXA | FR | 6712 | SCC | 11.21 | |
5 | STATE STREET CORPORATION | US | 6713 | SCC | 13.02 | |
6 | JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. | US | 6512 | SCC | 14.55 | |
7 | LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP PLC | GB | 6603 | SCC | 16.02 | |
8 | VANGUARD GROUP, INC., THE | US | 7415 | IN | 17.25 | |
9 | UBS AG | CH | 6512 | SCC | 18.46 | |
10 | MERRILL LYNCH & CO., INC. | US | 6712 | SCC | 19.45 | |
11 | WELLINGTON MANAGEMENT CO. L.L.P. | US | 6713 | IN | 20.33 | |
12 | DEUTSCHE BANK AG | DE | 6512 | SCC | 21.17 | |
13 | FRANKLIN RESOURCES, INC. | US | 6512 | SCC | 21.99 | |
14 | CREDIT SUISSE GROUP | CH | 6512 | SCC | 22.81 | |
15 | WALTON ENTERPRISES LLC | US | 2923 | T&T | 23.56 | |
16 | BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP. | US | 6512 | IN | 24.28 | |
17 | NATIXIS | FR | 6512 | SCC | 24.98 | |
18 | GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP, INC., THE | US | 6712 | SCC | 25.64 | |
19 | T. ROWE PRICE GROUP, INC. | US | 6713 | SCC | 26.29 | |
20 | LEGG MASON, INC. | US | 6712 | SCC | 26.92 | |
21 | MORGAN STANLEY | US | 6712 | SCC | 27.56 | |
22 | MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GROUP, INC. | JP | 6512 | SCC | 28.16 | |
23 | NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION | US | 6512 | SCC | 28.72 | |
24 | SOCIETE GENERALE | FR | 6512 | SCC | 29.26 | |
25 | BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION | US | 6512 | SCC | 29.79 | |
26 | LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC | GB | 6512 | SCC | 30.30 | |
27 | INVESCO PLC | GB | 6523 | SCC | 30.82 | |
28 | ALLIANZ SE | DE | 7415 | SCC | 31.32 | |
29 | TIAA | US | 6601 | IN | 32.24 | |
30 | OLD MUTUAL PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY | GB | 6601 | SCC | 32.69 | |
31 | AVIVA PLC | GB | 6601 | SCC | 33.14 | |
32 | SCHRODERS PLC | GB | 6712 | SCC | 33.57 | |
33 | DODGE & COX | US | 7415 | IN | 34.00 | |
34 | LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS, INC.* | US | 6712 | SCC | 34.43 | |
35 | SUN LIFE FINANCIAL, INC. | CA | 6601 | SCC | 34.82 | |
36 | STANDARD LIFE PLC | GB | 6601 | SCC | 35.2 | |
37 | CNCE | FR | 6512 | SCC | 35.57 | |
38 | NOMURA HOLDINGS, INC. | JP | 6512 | SCC | 35.92 | |
39 | THE DEPOSITORY TRUST COMPANY | US | 6512 | IN | 36.28 | |
40 | MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE INSUR. | US | 6601 | IN | 36.63 | |
41 | ING GROEP N.V. | NL | 6603 | SCC | 36.96 | |
42 | BRANDES INVESTMENT PARTNERS, L.P. | US | 6713 | IN | 37.29 | |
43 | UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA | IT | 6512 | SCC | 37.61 | |
44 | DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION OF JP | JP | 6511 | IN | 37.93 | |
45 | VERENIGING AEGON | NL | 6512 | IN | 38.25 | |
46 | BNP PARIBAS | FR | 6512 | SCC | 38.56 | |
47 | AFFILIATED MANAGERS GROUP, INC. | US | 6713 | SCC | 38.88 | |
48 | RESONA HOLDINGS, INC. | JP | 6512 | SCC | 39.18 | |
49 | CAPITAL GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC. | US | 7414 | IN | 39.48 | |
50 | CHINA PETROCHEMICAL GROUP CO. | CN | 6511 | T&T | 39.78 |
* Lehman still existed in the 2007 dataset used
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