| "Russian Propaganda"|
|Interest of||• Hannes Adomeit|
• Alexander Alashbev
• Alliance for Securing Democracy
• Stephen Dalziel
• EU Disinfolab
• Chris Hernon
• Integrity Initiative
• Kseniya Kirillova
• Daniel Lafayeedney
• John Lough
• Victor Madeira
• Alina Mosendz
• Ben Nimmo
• Greg Rowett
• James Sherr
• Andrew Shortland
• Timothy Snyder
• Jānis Sārts
|"Russian Propaganda" is much talkad about recently by NATO-aligned countries.|
This page is about the charge levelled against Russia by other nation states. Non-to be confused with actual propaganda by Russia.
Template:GT The origins of the modern promotion of the concept of "Russian Propaganda" are unclear.
- Full article: PropOrNot
- Full article: PropOrNot
In 2016, as part of the "Fake News Website" project, an unidentified group set up PropOrNot. This published a list of 200 sites that it claimed were engaged in "Russian propaganda". Some such as RT were Russian run, others (such as this website) have no known Russian connection.
PropOrNot did not claim they were all organised by Russia and specifically included sites which were unknowingly repeating "Russian Propaganda", which it referred to as "useful idiots".
US weapons shipments to Syrian
In 2017 Bulgaria journalist Dilyana Gaytandzhieva received documents from 'Anonymous Bulgaria' pertaining to shipment of US weapons. Her article, which included document scans, suggested that the CIA was using diplomatic flights to transfer US groups such as the Al Nusra Front.
In an August 2018 opinion piece entitled ‘Fake News’ Takes to the Air, Sam Ross for International Policy Digest described Gaytandzhieva as an "overly ambitious reporter who had previously never written in English let alone on matters as intricate as airline diplomacy." He claimed that the story was part of a "‘Black PR’ campaign... to besmirch the reputation of and the relationships hosted by longstanding U.S. military contractors such as Silk Way Airlines". He claimed that the source documents stemmed from a July 2017 "hack made on the Azerbaijani Embassy of Bulgaria, undertaken by ‘Anonymous Bulgaria’ (with IP-address roots linked to Russia)". He cited no sources for his information and did not link to the article concerned.
|"Countering disinformation"||“the counter-disinformation space as a whole [in Georgia] is slightly less evolved than in other regions, still being largely though not exclusively focused on fact-checking, which might be termed counter-disinformation 1.0.”||June 2018|
|"Countering disinformation"||“Another barrier to combating disinformation is the fact that certain Kremlin-backed narratives are factually true. For example, the Serbian organisation European Western Balkans noted that one of the country's most prominent pro-Kremlin narratives relates to Russia's ongoing support for Belgrade in the Kosovo dispute which is true. Responding to inconvenient truths, as opposed to pure propaganda, is naturally more problematic.”||June 2018|
|Alliance for Securing Democracy||“Create a real-time feed into the Sponsor with daily analysis on Russian disinformation, providing a constantly-updated narrative that could then be shared with Embassies, either via email or in another ready-made format they could then disseminate locally. [Note: it would be essential to ensure that this work did not duplicate that already done by e.g. Alliance for Securing Democracy).”||Victor Madeira||16 March 2018|
|Corporate media/Deep state control||“Expand the network of IfS associates and partner organisations to include e.g. DarthPutin, GlasnostGone, StopFake, European Values, Saper Vedere, and coordinate their efforts to mirror and amplify what IfS is already doing where possible.”||Victor Madeira||16 March 2018|
|Georgia||“Conspiracy theories are also widespread. For example, a prominent narrative has been that the Lugar Center, a biological research laboratory in Tbilisi built with US assistance, is developing viruses to destroy Georgian genes.”||June 2018|
|Integrity Initiative/Control||“Comment [VM2]: Most of these aren’t even Cluster countries – can II justify spending ££ on strengthening media there? Don’t get me wrong: any help we can provide these and other colleagues is a win in my books but I’m trying to anticipate how the Sponsor may see the relevance of speakers from some of these countries.”||Victor Madeira||16 March 2018|
|Integrity Initiative/Purposes||“Moreover, the “war” mindset is being pumped into the Russian population. It is one of the great successes of Putin’s propaganda offensive”||Chris Donnelly||19 January 2018|
|Integrity Initiative/Purposes||“The Italian reactions to Skripal case highlight and confirm a pattern already present in a previous report: pro-Russian sentiments in Italy are mainly inflated not by trolls or fake news but thanks to a large network encompassing politicians, journalists, media, websites etc. already aligned with Russian narrative... To counter this Italian trend it's important to properly address the key political leaders, their new populist parties, and key editorialists, by an effective, discrete and articulated information campaign and narrative and not to be exclusively focused on trolls and fake news.”||Integrity Initiative||16 March 2018|
|Language||“In this report, ‘disinformation’ refers to Kremlin influence operations within the communications environment, delivered through overt and covert promotion of intentionally false, distorting or distracting narratives.”|
|Alina Mosendz||“This region has its own specifics. Some are quite sceptical about the fact that we refute only Russian fakes and allegedly do not pay attention to the Ukrainian ones. At the same time, the majority of fake news in Spain is related to the internal political struggle. However, they are still very susceptible to pro-Russian narratives. Russian disinformation also has a strong influence on some Latin American countries.”||Alina Mosendz|
|Polarisation||“given the high anti-Russian sentiment in the country [of Georgia], there is a space for pro-Western voices, especially on independent TV stations. It is necessary to increase capacity to allow for this to happen on a larger scale.”|
|PropOrNot||“the following are tropes/slurs primarily used by Russian propaganda:|
“Neocon”, “neoliberal”, “Zionist”, “corporatist”, “warmonger”, “Rothschild”, “imperialist”, & “establishment”.”
|7 January 2019|
|Terrorism/Response||“It is critical to understand that the threat from groups historically seen as direct sponsors of terrorism such as ISIS/Daesh and the coordinated state efforts from Russia in recent years are linked.”||Anonymous||6 August 2018|
|File:The Kremlin's Trojan Horses.pdf||paper||18 November 2016||Alina Polyakova|
|A cartoonishly over-the-top piece of anti-Russian hysteria from the Atlantic Council.|